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Abstract:  
Based on observations of court trials and extensive interviews with judges, this article explores how 
judicial mediation in China undermines the rights of the battered women in divorce cases. We find 
that even if the judges are able to establish that domestic violence is committed, it is often erased in 
the stage of judicial mediation. This is because judicial mediation inevitably focuses on settlement 
arrangements. Lingering reference to domestic abuse would simply invite new denials or 
refutations from the abuser. It thus risks ruining the mediation efforts made by the judge. Our 
findings raise important questions with regard to the compulsory practice of mediation in family 
cases in China. It also sheds light on hidden problems created by judicial mediation or conciliation 
in general.  
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In the Name of Harmony: The Erasure of Domestic Violence in China’s Judicial 
Mediation 
 
Perhaps the most conspicuous development in the Chinese judicial reforms of the last 
decade is the return to judicial mediation.  Since the second term of Xiao Yang, the former 
president of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the Chinese court has once again emphasized 
mediation over adjudication. Official statistics shows that in 2010, more than 65% of civil cases 
were resolved through either mediation or its varied form (China Law Yearbook 2011),1 and the 
rate has been increasing for the past eight years. A primary justification of such a return is that 
mediation will contribute to social harmony (Xu 2006a; Fan 2005), a paramount goal pursued by 
the ruling communist party. For example, Liming Wang (2009: 69-70), a renowned scholar and 
lawmaker, states in this way:  
“Judicial mediation, as a combination of both ethics and laws, proves to be more acceptable 
to the parties, and the mediation agreements are more voluntarily performed. Thus, judicial 
mediation plays a positive role in resolving social conflicts and promoting social harmony.” 
Only a few scholars are critical on the practice. Minzner (2011) argues that overall judicial 
mediation will do harm to the long term build-up of rule of law in China, and some are skeptical of 
the overarching role of mediation in dispute resolution in China (Zhu 2010). There has also been a 
longstanding concern shared among scholars that in its attempt to attain settlement, judicial 
mediation as an exercise sacrifices legal rights litigants supposedly enjoy (Lubman 1999; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  In most situations, mediations and withdrawals are difficult to differentiate because a platintiff may 
withdraw her petition simply because a settlement has been reached. In official statistics, the case can be 
either categorized as one that is resolved by mediation or as withdrawal. 
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Peerenboom 2002; Wu 2009). Important as the concern raised by these scholars is, their focus is 
confined to the long-term impact of mediation to the legal system of China. It is fair to say that few 
have analyzed the international processes between the judges and litigants in judicial mediation (the 
only exception may be Wu 2007). The lack of data on how mediation actually works, especially the 
new form of judicial mediation (He and Ng 2012 manuscript) now prevalent in the Chinese legal 
system, means that little has been said about the present and immediate effects of the practice on 
the growing number of civil litigants who arrive at the doorsteps of the courthouses in China.  
One of the fastest growing and socially most vulnerable groups of civil litigants is battered 
women who seek relief from the abuses done to them by their husbands. Domestic violence has 
become an increasingly serious problem in China. By some estimates, as high as 30 per cent of 
families in China have issues with domestic violence (Wexler 2003; Woo 2003). According to Wu 
(2007: 203), who reviewed 310 divorce cases from 1950-2004 from a county in southern China, 
almost in all of the cases the wives alleged being abused by the husbands. Drawing from 
ethnographic observations of the actual proceedings of judicial mediation and in-depth interviews 
with judges who preside over divorce trials, this article explores how judicial mediation undermines 
the rights of these battered women in divorce cases. We find that even when the judges have been 
able to find evidence of domestic violence, it is often underplayed or erased in judicial mediation. 
We refer to this omission as a form of “erasure,” in ways similar to “the marginalization of 
domestic violence” found by Greatbatch and Dingwall (1999) as well as Trinder et al (2010) in 
their study of divorce mediation sessions. But the erasure practice underlines the wider power 
discrepancies inherited in judicial mediation in China. As we will show, women plaintiffs are 
rendered as passive victims who simply want to get out of their marriage in Chinese-style judicial 
mediation. Our findings raise important questions with regard to the policies on China’s family law 
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procedures; in particular, it points to the inadequacies in safeguarding the human rights of women 
who suffered domestic violence. It also sheds light on the hidden problems created by a system 
that values conciliation and quick resolution over adjudication and the delivery of justice. 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS IN CHINA 
While gender equality has long been hailed as a fundamental social goal by the Chinese 
communist regime, the term “domestic violence” did not appear in Chinese laws until 2001, the 
year when the marriage law was revised. In 2001, the SPC further issued a judicial interpretation of 
the new marriage law. Domestic violence is defined as behavior toward a member of the family that 
results in injurious consequences physically, emotionally, or in other ways by “beating, tying up, 
injuring, forcibly restricting one’s personal freedom, or by other means” (Wang 2004: 182). Article 
3 of the law prohibits domestic violence. Article 32 states that divorce shall be granted by court if 
domestic violence or, maltreatment and desertion of one family member by another, is found. For 
the purposes of this article, the most relevant part of the law is Article 46, which provides that the 
innocent party is entitled to damage compensation in divorces as a result of domestic violence. 
There are also some piecemeal local legislation and administrative orders that regulate the use of 
restraint orders. But the three articles mentioned above already make up the core of the domestic 
violence law in China at the national level. Activists and scholars have called for a separate and 
more comprehensive national law on domestic violence. However, at the time of this writing, it has 
not been placed on the agenda of the National People Congress (NPC), the highest legislative body 
of China. Scholars have commented that the existing stipulations on domestic violence are terse 
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and, in fact, quite vague. That said, the revised marriage law does allow for recourse to civil 
litigation for battered women. 
Historically, there have been many difficulties facing battered women who took their cases to 
courts. Law enforcement officers in China were not particularly concerned with domestic violence 
complaints (Liu 2001: 6-7; cited by Merry 2006: 149). They classified these complaints as “spousal 
quarrels” or “family trouble.” Furthermore, in part because of the Confucian belief in social 
harmony and in part because of the Chinese reluctance to interfere the “family matters” of others, 
there was a general reluctance for family members, friends, coworkers, and relatives to testify 
against the violent husband in court serve as witnesses” (Xu 2006a; 2006b).  “Even brothers and 
sisters of the abused woman may feel intervention inappropriate” (Liu 2001: 6-7; cited by Merry 
2006: 149).  
In cases where eye witnesses are either reluctant or unavailable to come forward to testify 
(and there were many), judges have been reluctant to address domestic violence in their rulings. 
Subject to heavy scrutiny from the upper-level courts, these judges do not want to issue any 
decisions without strong evidence. There are good reasons for judges to exercising cautions in this 
area of law, with self-preservation perhaps the biggest psychological driver. China’s lower-level trial 
courts have been and still are consistently plagued by a high appeal rate of their judgments. A 
junior judge can be subject to disciplinary measures or other punishment when adjudicatory 
mistakes, which are not uncommon, are identified. For example, in 1999, about 50% of trial court 
judgments were appealed. Among these judgments, only about a quarter (26.6%) of them were 
sustained (Zhong and Yu 2004: 428). According to the current evidence rule, if a victim cannot 
provide strong evidence (e.g., a medical certificate of the injuries suffered and/or police reports), 
she is not considered to have satisfied the burden of proof required for convicting an alleged 
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violent husband. In these cases, most courts are left with no options but to disregard the existence 
of domestic violence (Huang 2010: 133-134).  
But domestic violence has become an increasingly serious social problem in China, so much 
so that it has made itself into the official agenda and public discourse of the Chinese government. 
For example, in 2008, Sun Xiaomei, an NPC deputy and professor at the Chinese Women's 
College, said: "Domestic violence is a social phenomenon that crosses all social strata and is 
becoming more and more common. There is an urgent need for legislation” (Jian 2008).	  In 2010, 
the state-backed All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), the largest women organization in 
China, announced that its branches nationwide received 52,000 petitions from women who 
suffered from domestic violence (China Daily 2012). It further declared that “domestic violence 
poses a severe threat to women's rights in China” (Xinhua 2009).  
In response to the newfound attention to addressing domestic violence, Chinese judges are 
now taking steps to protecting women from domestic violence. The court we conducted our study, 
for example, was among one of the courts in ten provinces that participated in a national pilot 
program for issuing protection orders to victims of domestic violence. The order, models on 
similar orders (protection from abuse orders, restraining orders) commonly used in Anglo-
American law, forbids a husband from coming within 100 meters of the wife’s home. It also forbids 
the husband from harassing, frightening, hitting or following Chen, her relatives and friends. If he 
violates the order, the court will also detain or impose a fine on him (China Daily 2002).  
More importantly, judges are more proactive in proving the existence of domestic violence, 
usually by getting the abuser to confess. The biggest structural hurdle, as the rest of this article 
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demonstrate, is the conflicting demands created by the in-trial judicial mediation procedure in 
resolving family disputes, including divorce petitions.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The episodes analyzed in this article are taken from trials that we attended in December 
2011 at a district court in City Z in Southern China. Located at the heart of the Pearl River Delta, 
the most affluent region of the country, the city’s GDP per capita reached USD 11,000 in 2010. It 
has thus attracted a large number of migrant workers, who come from the hinterland areas of the 
country for a better living. Of the 800,000 population in the jurisdiction of the trial court in which 
our sampled trials were heard, a total 300,000 of them were registered migrants. While the official 
language is Mandarin, a significant portion of the population speak Cantonese as their everyday 
language. 
Our data come from three different sources. The first, and the main source of our data, are 
our direct observations of divorce trials in action.  Gaining access to the court through personal 
connection, we observed the trials of a designated family court for a period that lasted about a 
month. The designated family court was made up of three judges, two regular women judges and a 
male judge seconded from nearby county court to help clear the accumulating caseloads. 
Comparing to common law trials, which can last for weeks, even months, civil trials in China 
generally proceed at a crisp pace. It typically takes one court session, i.e., a half day, for a hearing 
to complete. Some trials are shorter than others. We saw trials that were quickly wrapped up in 
around ten minutes (e.g., when the defendant did not show up). That said, a typical hearing takes 
up about one to two hours. We observed about twenty hearings during the period of our study, of 
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which about a third allegedly involved domestic violence. 
Tape recording of proceedings is not allowed in the courtrooms of China. During our 
fieldwork, we relied mostly on our written notes. The relative short sessions made extensive note 
taking a less exhausting exercise. Toward the end of our fieldwork, the local judiciary kindly agreed 
to make available to us copies of official court transcripts of a number of trial sessions we had 
attended. The transcripts were prepared by court clerks who worked with judges. The transcripts 
used below are based on our own written notes and the official transcripts.2 
The second part of our data is made up of our interviews with the judges. We interviewed 
the judges who presided over the trials we observed. We were also able to interview other judges 
who had handled divorce hearings in their career, as well as court administrators and researchers 
who could provide us with information about the new judicial initiatives to address domestic 
violence. The interviews provided us with useful background information about why judges asked 
certain questions and what evidence they considered would constitute the basis of the court 
decision. We asked them, among other matters related to China’s civil justice system, of their views 
about the existing practices of in-trial mediation. In some cases, we discussed with them certain 
specific trials we observed. As a group, they were candid and open about their opinions on the 
performance of the parties, the weight they gave to certain evidence, and their rationale for the 
decisions they reached. The interviews lasted from between thirty to ninety minutes. 
Our field site is a compelling setting in which to study how domestic violence is handled as a 
legal problem in China. As mentioned, the county court we studied was among one of the courts in 
the national pilot program to reinforce protection for women against domestic violence. We make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In the interest of space, we reproduce only the English translation of the transcripts. The transcripts in the 
original Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese) are on file with the authors. 
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further efforts to validate the generality of our findings. For our third data source, we interviewed, 
mostly by phone, experienced family court judges in different parts of China, including the 
provinces of Jiangsu, Guangxi, Zhejiang, and Shaanxi. All these findings are integrated with 
secondary data collected by others on this topic (e.g., Wu 2007; Huang 2010). 
 
 
JUDICIAL MEDIATION 
For a country as populous and fast-changing as China, its civil procedure is highly unified and 
homogeneous. The same set of procedures applies across different parts of the country. If one 
attends a civil trial in China today, the presiding judge will announce at the beginning of the process 
that a civil trial consists of four stages: court investigation, court discussion, court mediation, and 
decision announcement. Each of the different stages is part of the civil trial process. The judge thus 
serves as both adjudicator and mediator at different stages of the trial. In most trials, mediation 
takes place right after the court investigation and discussion, within the same court session (usually 
lasting a morning or an afternoon).  
The current Civil Procedural Law stipulates that the court may or may not conduct 
mediation after court discussion. But for family cases, mediation remains a compulsory procedure 
that requires litigant to participate. This is primarily because, as mentioned earlier, mediation has 
long been regarded as a way to mitigate family conflicts and contribute to family and social 
harmony. This emphasis has been further intensified since 2004, halfway through the Western-
style civil procedural reforms initiated by the former SPC president Xiao Yang. The party and 
higher-up believed that the Western style of judicial reforms had gone too far: they believed that 
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the reformed judiciary did not really resolve disputes, even though many cases could be said to 
have been adjudicated with a higher degree of procedural fairness. They also believed that the 
skyrocketing number of petitions (shangfang) was a result of the incompetency of the judiciary. The 
policy response is for the judiciary to renew its reliance on the role of mediation (Fu and Cullen 
2011; Wayne and Xiong 2011). Accordingly, courts have been revising their incentive mechanisms 
to encourage judicial mediation.3 As a result, many courts, including the court that we visited, have 
been requiring their judges to settle, through mediation, a certain percentage of cases they handle. 
The ratio of cases being closed with a mediated settlement has become a criterion to assess a 
judge’s performance. There is also competition among courts for higher overall mediation rate. 
Henan High Court, for instance, even claim that their goal is to achieve zero adjudication, meaning 
that all the cases received by the courts are resolved with mediated settlements (Peng 2011).   
Pressure from senior court administrators aside, some judges do prefer mediation to 
adjudication: enforcement becomes less of a concern when parties agree to settle as a result of 
mediation; there is no risk for a decision of being appealed against since the result is agreed upon 
by the parties; judges are spared the effort of writing a judgment. Of course, many judges also 
believe that both parties are better off with a settlement. All these considerations compel judges to 
adopt a heavy-handed approach to litigants at in-court mediation sessions. As a consequence, the 
percentage of civil cases resolved through mediation in China has since increased, while the rate of 
adjudication has decreased from 43% in 2002 to 31% in 2010 (China Law Yearbook 2011). 
EVIDENCE: THE FOCUS OF COURT INVESTIGATION 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The SPC Provisions on Court’s Civil Mediation Work in 2004 provide that “all cases that can be mediated 
should be mediated.” 
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It is under this context that we should understand the behavior patterns of the judges in 
divorce hearings. Trials in China are judge-centered. Until recently, it has been the judge alone 
who owned fact-finding power. But the courts nowadays rarely collect evidence outside the 
courtroom (He 2009; Huang 2010; Woo 2003). They are many reasons why judges today do not 
want to initiate out-court investigation of their own, some ideological and some practical. 
Ideologically, China’s courts are shifting to a judicial philosophy of dangshiren zhuyi, meaning 
litigant’s choice. Courts have now gradually passed the responsibility of proving a case to litigants. 
Practically, there are many reasons why judges want to avoid out-court investigation – the ever 
increasing caseloads received by courts, limited human and financial resources, the pressure to 
boost efficiency by closing a case within a relative short timeframe. Judges now engage in a limited 
form of cross-examination aimed to obtain oral testimony that can be used to justify a decision. 
This kind of judge-initiated questioning thus becomes an inexpensive substitute for the previously 
labor-intensive court investigation. In other words, the court investigation stage offers them an 
important opportunity to collect evidence which forms the basis of their later adjudicative decisions, 
if a settlement cannot be reached. The evidence on which their potential adjudicative decisions are 
based must be strong enough to safeguard the judges from any potential liabilities for wrongfully 
decided cases.  
When domestic violence is alleged, it is the responsibility of the judge to take proofs to 
validate the claims. An allegation of domestic violence are usually denied or refuted by the 
husband. But a judge, for the purpose of collecting evidence, is willing to confront the litigants in 
this process. The excerpt below is taken from a case we observed where domestic violence is 
alleged by the wife as the ground for divorce: 
 [Judge] On the very early morning of the 25th of September, 2011, is it true that you hit her? 
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 [Defendant] (pause) What do you mean by hitting? I don’t know. Hitting means… 
 [Judge] Didn’t I just show this to you? She said you used your fists, and a solid object, a folding 
chair that was, to hit her back. She was at pains. Then she called the police. The police gave you a 
warning when they arrived.  
 [Defendant] No, no, no, I didn’t hit her. At the time, we were fighting with each other. 
 [Plaintiff] The police then… 
 [Defendant] We were fighting with each other! We were fighting with each other! 
 [Judge] Fighting with each other? But did you hit her back with that folding chair? 
 [Defendant] Just to scare her. 
 [Judge] Was her back hurt? 
 [Defendant] This I’m not sure. 
 [Judge] (turning to the court clerk) Scared her. Then I asked him if the plaintiff’s back was hurt, he 
said he didn’t know.  
[Judge] (turning to the defendant) Afterwards, the police were at your home, right? 
 [Defendant] Yes, at my home. 
 [Judge] What did the police do when they got to your home? 
 [Defendant] They asked a few questions; and then told us not to argue again. They asked us not to 
argue about little things. They kept a record of our names and then they left. 
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 [Judge] So on that day, did you hit her or not? 
 [Defendant] I did not hit her. We were fighting with each other.  
This is a disturbing, and yet unfortunately, not too uncommon case that one finds in the 
family courts of China today. During the trial, the plaintiff, a lowly-educated “rural wife” is 
emotional. She claims that her husband has beaten her and their son for over 600 times during the 
course of their marriage. She struggles to hold her composure. She testifies with a wailing voice, 
recounting the violence inflicted on her. The air was heavy inside the courtroom. It is a difficult 
experience for the audience as well. As shown in the above conversation between the husband and 
the judge, the husband denies he used violence. He describes what happened as duida in Chinese, 
meaning fighting with each other. The judge tries to see if there is any police report which might 
constitute strong evidence against the defendant. But apparently the police just made a routine visit 
and then left without investigating the incident in detail. Without a police investigation, the case 
turns on the evidence the wife produces through her testimony. Apparently, the judge is of the view 
that the oral testimony of the wife alone, does not carry enough weight to warrant a her to factor in 
domestic violence in her decision on the divorce petition. In a bid to draw out more damning 
details from the man, the judge launches a series of probing question to get the defendant to 
acknowledge the use of violence: 
 [Judge] Have you ever choked her? 
 [Defendant] As for choking, I did that when she hit me; I feared that she would hit me back.  
 [Judge] (turning to the clerk) I asked him if he ever choked the plaintiff. He said he did, for fear 
that she hit back. (turning to the defendant) How long did you choke her?  
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 [Defendant] I guess it was about five seconds. Four or five seconds. 
 [Judge] When you choked the plaintiff, what was her reaction? 
 [Defendant] She hit me with her hands, or sometimes kicked me. 
 [Judge] And have ever choked your son? 
 [Defendant] I did. Yes, yes.  
 [Judge] (turning to the clerk) The plaintiff resisted. Choked his son. (turning to the defendant) 
When you choked her, was she not able to breathe?  
 [Defendant] No 
 [Judge] How many times did you choke your son?  
 [Defendant] Probably once or twice. 
 [Judge] What about the plaintiff? 
 [Judge] It’s about the same. 
 [Plaintiff] Tell the truth. 
 [Defendant] I told the truth. 
 [Plaintiff] Tell the truth about what you did to our son. Tell the truth about what you did to me. 
Don’t say it was just twice! Don’t say things that contradict your conscience.  
 [Defendant] We lived together for twenty-odd years. How much have I done for you? What have 
you done for me? 
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 [Plaintiff] You should tell the judge. 
 [Judge] How many times have you choked the plaintiff?  
 [Defendant] Twice. 
This excerpt shows how the judge tries to prove the wife’s domestic violence claim through a 
form of cross-examination commonly seen in the civil courts of common law jurisdictions. In the 
interviews with us right after the court trial, she said choking is serious – it is life-threatening; and 
once a husband did it to his wife, he tended to repeat it again; and later incidents of choking often 
perpetuate even greater violence against the wife. From the judge’s perspective, choking, if 
admitted or proven, constitutes a piece of strong evidence for domestic violence claims. To make 
the case beyond reproach, the judge asks the husband how many times he choked his wife and his 
son. The judge is also meticulous in asking how long the man choked his wife and son during these 
incidents. The judge is doubtful if the man told the truth. Upon hearing his testimony, his abused 
wife is emotional and asks him not to contradict his conscience. The man tries to downplay the 
severity of these choking incidents – he said they happened once or twice; and each time they 
lasted for just four, five seconds; and above all, they happened not as brunt violence against his wife, 
but as his way to defend himself in a fight with a woman who was trying to hit him hard. As the 
judge told us afterwards, from the perspective of law, what the man admitted was enough to prove 
domestic violence. The judge is so careful that more than once she has instructed her court clerk 
what to put down on the court records, which will be signed by both litigants, in ways that capture 
the gravity of the man’s testimony. “He admitted he choked her; and he also choked his son.” The 
judge carefully rephrased the language to align the man’s testimony with the relevant facts that 
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constitute the legal definition of domestic violence, an important technique as identified by Mather 
and Yngvesson (1980-1981).  
The judge does not stop here. She further inquires another incident in which the wife claims 
that the husband took her away from work and threatened to tie her up and abuse her.  
The judge, once again, tries to retrieve the details of the incident by questioning the 
defendant. 
 [Defendant] I went to her unit to see her then. At the time, she had left home for seven days. I 
went to her unit to pull her out from her work because I wanted her to come back home. Come 
back home; whether we were to divorce or stay together, we could discuss later. Come back home 
first. But she was dragging out the discussion.  She said this and she said that. I was angry. I faked 
hitting her. But it happened at the work unit. I didn’t know who reported to the police. She was 
away from home for seven days then.  
 [Judge] You said you pulled her out from her work, right? What next? 
 [Defendant] Yes, we took the taxi to get home. 
 [Judge] Took the taxi. And then you dragged her back home? 
 [Defendant] I didn’t drag her back home. She left her work to her colleagues, then returned home. 
And then I followed her back home. But then we went back and forth with several taxis. Back and 
forth. It was a hassle. 
In our interview with her, the judge said although the wife claimed that there were witnesses 
and video recordings, she was unsure if the additional oral and material evidence would be made 
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available to the court. But the questions confronting the husband have secured sufficient evidence. 
For another instance, the judge got from the defendant to admit that the couple changed taxis 
several times back and forth on the day he pulled his wife from her workplace. The judge said the 
fact that the couple changed taxis was another piece of good evidence to corroborate the domestic 
violence claims. In her opinion, it is difficult to explain why the couple had to change taxis and 
went back and forth on the trip. The judge argued that this strongly suggested that the wife was 
resisting her husband’s attempt to carry her away from work and physical violence was likely 
involved. While the judge did not undertake a full-fledged cross-examination, she sought to, within 
the limited time available in a Chinese civil trial (as mentioned, which normally lasted for a half day 
in a busy court like the court we studied in City Z), built a case through oral testimonies.  
The analysis above identifies several points, which are also supported by the data we gathered 
from the other cases we observed. First, contrary to the common stereotype that many lowly 
educated women in China are too acquiescent to defy their husbands in public, the women who 
appeared in the trials we observed were not intimidated to tell the judge that they had been 
victimized by their abusive husbands. Indeed, some of them were eager to tell the judge, for legal 
as well as cathartic reasons. Many are prepared to address domestic violence issues directly in court. 
In this case, the woman plaintiff addresses in detail the severity of violence against her. Our data 
seem to suggest that once women have decided to undertake legal action, they have little difficulty 
in overcoming the stigma of talking “family matters” in public.  In our interviews with the judges, 
they said they believed some women plaintiffs thought strategically. Some women believed that 
domestic violence might help them obtain a quick divorce decision; some women believed that a 
violent husband would lose child custody; others believed it provided leverage for getting a 
favorable division of marital property. But judges acknowledged that some women simply wanted 
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to shame their husbands, or relieve their fear and frustration in public. For these various reasons, 
women plaintiffs often raise the issue of domestic violence during the court investigation stage of a 
trial. The problem facing these women was that they did not know how to, as it were, produce 
evidence and give testimonies in court. Many of them are not represented by lawyers. Even when 
represented, they usually do not have the required documents (police report, medical records, or 
their own written statements made at the time when they were abused) necessary for the purposes 
of the law.  
Second, as a result of the virtual abandonment of out-trial court investigations, the in-trial 
court investigation stage is becoming more important for judges to prove domestic violence. It 
remains the discretion of a judge whether she wants to “cross-examine” an alleged abuser or not; 
but for those judges who do, it is clear that in-trial court investigation has become a judge’s main 
weapon to prove or disprove unresolved allegations of domestic violence.  
Third, the role of a judge depends heavily on the person’s skills and willingness to collect 
evidence. As shown in the above case, for example, the judge goes beyond the neutral role of 
assessing evidence, and plays an active role in collecting evidence. This is within the range of the 
Chinese procedural law, but it is also equally lawful had the judge simply dismissed the domestic 
violence claim on the ground that the plaintiff was not able to produce evidence herself. In this 
case, the man gave testimony that the judge considered sufficient for proving domestic violence. In 
taking a proactive role, the judge’s effort to collect evidence in the court investigation stage offers a 
chance in protecting the domestic abuse victims.  
A proven domestic violence allegation is consequential for the plaintiff and her family. Not 
only is it more likely for the plaintiff to get a favorable divorce settlement and win the child custody 
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battle, she also receives protection by the court from her husband’s future abuses. For the court 
that we study, which is one of the courts involved in the aforementioned national pilot program, it 
can issue a protection order to remove the husband from his home and prevent him from seeing 
his son or even talking to his wife. Unfortunately, the evidence collected in this stage, as we will 
show, will be erased in the court mediation stage when the focus then is to work out a solution, 
which is incompatible with any confrontation. 
SOLUTION: THE FOCUS OF COURT MEDIATION 
The role of the judge in the court investigation stage contrasts greatly with her role in the 
mediation stage that immediately follows. From the perspective of the judge, while the focus of 
court investigation is to collect evidence, the focus of mediation switches to achieving resolution: 
the goal of the judge here is to find a middle ground that both litigating parties would agree upon. If 
the key question that dominates the investigation stage is “Did you commit what she accused you of 
doing?”, the key question at the mediation stage is “Do you accept this proposed solution?” 
In the divorce case we detailed in the previous section, there was too much hatred between 
the couple for any meaningful mediation effort. Even though, for reasons unknown to us, the 
woman later withdrew her case, the judge said in her later interview with us that she was prepared 
to address the issue of domestic violence in that case. Other cases are not as clear-cut. Of the other 
four cases where domestic violence was alleged, the issue was ignored and discounted because 
these cases had gone through the intensive procedure of in-court mediation. Many couples are 
willing to go through judge-directed mediation, not so much because they want to stay together 
again, but more because there is still a lot to bargain with their estranged spouse.  For many 
uncontested divorce cases, there is little doubt left that divorce would be the eventual outcome: 
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when a divorce petition is filed, the petitioner is usually determined to divorce. Under the current 
de facto no-fault rule governing divorce (Huang 2010; Davis 2010), the petitioner would get his or 
her wish fulfilled sooner or later. Indeed, as He (2009) finds in another court in Guangdong 
province, the number of divorce petitions approved is three times as much as those petitions 
denied. It is, quite simply, only a matter of time. The mediation session focuses on the partition of 
child custody and marital property. In so doing, it is almost inevitable that the question about 
domestic violence, which is almost invariably denied by the abuser, is erased. As shown, when 
domestic violence is examined during the court investigation stage, the litigation parties are 
confrontational. It is common for parties to trade accusations, curses, and denials. If the judge still 
focuses on the issues of the investigation stage, including domestic violence, lingering investigations 
would undermine the reconciliatory tone required to facilitate successful settlement. It is for this 
reason that erasure is a consequence of mediation. 
That is exactly what happened in another case we observed in which domestic violence was 
alleged but was not subsequently followed up in the mediation stage of the trial. It is a divorce case 
in which the couple have been separating from some years and the husband is now living with 
another woman. There were no disputes that the husband has committed domestic violence and 
had extra-marital affairs: the wife provided police reports and pictures of bruises. The two agree to 
divorce; their disputes are mainly about how to divide up their communal unit and their 
responsibilities towards their son. The 13-year-old son has been living with his mother. As in many 
other divorce cases, the estranging husband and wife were fighting over various accusations in the 
court investigation process. The atmosphere was tense and confrontational in the first hour of the 
trial. As if she were intended to prevent the confrontation from escalating, the judge quickly moved 
to mediation without formally announcing that the investigation and discussion stages were over. In 
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fact, she did not formally ask the two parties if they would agree to participate in mediation, as most 
judges would ask at the end of the court discussion. She started working on a settlement right away 
she knew the two sides had no intention to linger on with their failing marriage. After about 30 
minutes of negotiations back and forth with the couple, the judge managed to work out a number 
that indicated the sum of money the wife would get in renouncing her half of the property. 
Eventually the judge persuaded the two sides to agree to adopt the number (200,000 yuan) as the 
basis of their settlement. Beside the disagreement over dividing the communal property, the couple 
also disagree over child support. The plaintiff is willing to pay 500 yuan per month, but his wife the 
defendant wants more. She asks for a monthly child support of 800 yuan. The judge quickly 
decides that she is trying to get the two sides to settle on 600 yuan. To the judge’s surprise, the 
plaintiff refuses to raise his offer to make up the 100 yuan (approximately $15 per month) 
difference. This put the judge in a tough spot. She has already let both parties know a 
compromised figure that she found to be acceptable, knocking down the wife’s request of 800 yuan 
by 200 yuan. She thought this could get the deal done. But the plaintiff’s recalcitrance created an 
impasse.  
In order to get the deal done, as we detailed elsewhere (He and Ng 2012 manuscript), the 
judge marshaled all sorts of resources available to convince the man. She mentioned the money 
was used to support his son, not a stranger; she also mentioned that as his son is already 13 years 
old, the overall amount of support is not a big sum because the man is only responsible for 
supporting the child till the age of 18; she even challenged the truthfulness of the man’s salary, 
which according to the law, is used as the basis for calculating the amount of child support; she 
preached to the man that it was his duty as a father to support his son. What is most revealing for 
our purpose here is that the judge never mentioned a word about domestic violence. Should not 
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the man be held responsible for his abusive behavior, as stipulated by Article 46 of the amended 
Marriage Law? Is not it an excellent leverage to force the man to agree to raise his child support by 
100 yuan?  
In another case documented by Wu (2007: 277-281), the wife repeatedly raised the issue of 
domestic violence and presented police reports that she suffered light injury. The husband denied 
the link between the injury and his behavior. Below is an excerpt of a private conversation between 
the judge and the wife during mediation in the absence of her husband and her family.  
Wife: “I dared not disclose anything to anyone outside of the family. Sometimes I was all 
beat up and bruised. But when other people asked me how I got my bruises, I just told that was 
because I fell. I dared not even tell the truth to my own parents.” 
Judge: “If both sides can reach a settlement, we will ask you to sign the mediation agreement. 
If not, the court will adjudicate. We will try our best. The mediation ends here.”  
This conversation shows that the judge did not even take up the topic of domestic violence 
raised by the wife. In mediation, as the term suggests, the two parties tries to arrive voluntarily at a 
resolution. The judge, who now acts as a mediator, removes the adjudicatory frame that looks for 
fault and denounces wrongful behaviors. The rights-based focus prevailed at the investigation of 
domestic violence is now superseded by the need-based focus of mediation (Cobb 1997). The 
judge, in order to achieve a mediated result, was extremely careful in maintaining a less antagonistic 
atmosphere. Further allegations of domestic abuse would simply invite more denials or refutations 
from the man and compromise her efforts to mediate. In other words, to get a mediation result, 
the judge has to exclude blame from her discourse.  
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Evolving from court investigation to court mediation thus involves a process called by Cobb 
(1997) as “transformation.” In court investigation stage, the rules are legal, focusing on rights and 
obligations, based on the availability of evidence; but in court mediation stage, the rules are 
mediatory, focusing on needs. In the mediation session, the mediatory rules soon gain dominance 
and expand its authority and jurisdiction, crowding out concerns for legal rights and moral blaming. 
Cobb (1997: 413) points out,  
“[t]he goal of mediation is to reach agreements, to meet the needs of individuals, not instantiate a 
moral code. In fact, mediation is designed to subsume moral differences by colonizing competing 
moralities: There is no ‘right’ way to live, except that morality which permits and enforces 
relativism.”  
 
Also, as demonstrated by Fineman (1988) in her analysis of custody mediation, the rights of 
parents are collapsed into the needs of the children through the discourse fostered by the “best 
interest” doctrine. Because the goal of mediation is to reach agreements, it has to meet the needs of 
the individuals and the overall discourse is pragmatic (He and Ng 2013 forthcoming). Indeed, as 
Silbey and Sarat (1989) note, mediation legitimates itself as a practice by distinguishing between 
rights and needs: rights discourse is suitable for formal settings in which hierarchy and power are at 
issue; needs discourse is suitable for mediation where it is not power but participation that is at 
issue. The mediation session offers a setting for both disputants, as co-participants with equal social 
and legal status in the resolution of conflict. In this process any violence, including domestic one 
and especially those are still subject to dispute because of a lack of evidence and the vague legal 
stipulation, has to make room or relational and economic security and thus be sidelined to a level 
of disappearing.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Western researchers have found that in community-based mediation sessions, domestic 
violence is often domesticated (Lerman 1984; Rifkin 1989; Sarat and Kearns 1991; Cobb 1997; 
Greatbatch and Dingwall 1999). By “marginalization,” Greatbatch and Dingwall (1999: 187) means 
that violence reports are “ignored or minimized”, and events are framed as “relational as opposed 
to criminal.” The situation is no better in court-based mediation programs. As Trinder et al 
(2009)’s study of the English system found out, family justice professionals continued to 
marginalize allegations of domestic violence, some even turned punitive in cases where women 
insisted on the issue. This article shows that in China, despite the fact that the issue of domestic 
violence is raised, discussed, and even established in the court investigation process, it is eventually 
forgotten, often unnoticed in the court’s final mediation session. If anything, the situation in China 
is more serious, for two reasons. First, since it is the judge who mediates in China, she is entitled to 
adopt a much more interventionist approach to sideline allegations of domestic violence. 
Compared to what is discussed as marginalization (Greatbatch and Dingwall 1999) or 
domestication (Cobb 1997), the erasure of domestic violence in China is more coercive; this is in 
part due to the obvious power gap between the judge and the disputants. Judges are aggressive and 
proactive in setting a mediatory tone, compared to the more subtle handling by mediators in 
community mediations. Second, from the perspective of the victims, the process is somewhat 
deceptive. This is because of the presence of judicial mediation within a framework of adjudication 
(He and Ng 2012 manuscript). The victims who choose to settle the case might think they have 
sought a legal redress, but in fact they have unknowingly surrendered their legal rights in agreeing 
to a mediated deal. Moreover, in going through judicial mediation, they have already exhausted all 
their legal remedies and there are no other recourses. The Chinese government has finally come to 
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realize the seriousness of domestic violence as a social issue. However, its judicial infrastructure, 
caught between the conflicting goals of achieving efficiency and protecting the socially vulnerable, is 
structurally incapable of addressing the issue in a systematic and comprehensive way.  
During the past decade, the use of mediation to resolve civil disputes, including divorce 
petitions and other family disputes, has been on a steady rise in China. Official statistics shows that 
in 2010, more than 65% of civil cases were resolved through either mediation or its varied form. 
What we described here is part of a bigger trend. We discussed this wider phenomenon and its 
implications to the rule of law in China elsewhere (He and Ng 2012 manuscript). Here, our 
findings suggested that family violence factored into a judge's decision only in the most blatant cases. 
As mentioned, of the about twenty cases we observed, the case we analyzed above was the only one 
we observed where the judge brought up and addressed the issue of domestic violence in her 
judgment. For the other handful of cases in which allegation of domestic violence was made, the 
issue was marginalized and overlooked in the process of mediation. This phenomenon is also 
consistent with the findings from other regions (Wu 2007). All these show how substantive concern 
over domestic violence is sidestepped and superseded by the administrative preference of 
mediation over adjudication for the courts. Furthermore, the fact that the court we study 
participated in China's national pilot program for protecting women against domestic violence 
seems to suggest that other courts might bestow even lesser attention to the issue.  
Our findings thus seriously challenge the practice of judicial mediation in China and 
particularly the arrangement of civil procedure on family cases. In China, mediation is a 
compulsory requirement for family law-related cases, whether or not the litigants want to participate 
in the process. The compulsory requirement is justified by the belief that mediation alleviates 
creates a less antagonistic environment that reduces further disputes and favors solution. It also 
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facilitates the disputants to consider the best interests of the most vulnerable party, i.e., children of 
divorced couples. More mediation and less litigation is also said to promote social stability. This 
justification seems so powerful that they are seldom questioned or challenged in the context of 
China. This study reveals a significant problem of the current practice: victims of domestic violence 
are paying a heavy price for what is seemingly a well-intended procedural arrangement. While it is 
unclear whether judicial mediation indeed realizes its goals, it is clear that the rights of victims of 
domestic violence are compromised. To avoid such undesirable consequences, the current 
compulsory requirement shall be abandoned. Furthermore, in line with what has been suggested 
by some scholars, a certain screening system can be introduced to screen cases involving family 
violence from mediation (Hester et al 1997; Trinder et al 2010). At the very minimum, the victims 
of domestic violence going through the mediation process shall be formally warned of such a 
consequence. 
By the same token, policy makers shall also seriously consider whether judicial mediation 
shall be allowed in other types of cases in which violence is involved. In the meantime, there is a 
tendency in China’s judicial practice to reconcile the attackers and victims in personal tort and even 
criminal cases (Chen 2006). Whether or not the issue of violence is also erased in mediations of 
other types of cases awaits further research. For violated women seeking divorce, this study 
cautions strongly against any congratulatory view of mediation as a cure-all social panacea.  
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